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Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

The Secretary of Agriculture denied Frick Farm's petition for administrative review, and the Kansas District Court affirmed the DWR
order. The district court reasoned that DWR correctly interpreted and
applied the law when terminating the water right. Additionally, the
district court found that the verified report of nonuse constituted substantial evidence supporting DWR's ruling. Upon appeal to the Kansas
Court of Appeals, the court affirmed the district court's ruling terminating the water right.
Frick Farm argued that its water right is equivalent to a property
right that the State could not terminate without first proving every
element of the water right's forfeiture. However, the court held that
the State, which created the property right to the water, can place conditions on the retention of that right. Specifically, the court cited the
Water Appropriation Act as explicitly granting the State authority to
terminate any owner's water right if the owner fails to make beneficial
use of the water for 5 successive years, and is also unable to provide
due and sufficient cause for the nonuse. Debes and Frick Farm failed
to make beneficial use of the water right and did not provide sufficient
cause for nonuse. Furthermore, because DWR's letters gave Frick
Farm sufficient notice and DWR held an abandonment hearing pursuant to statutory procedures, the court held that the state did not violate
Frick Farm's due process in terminating its water rights.
Frick Farm also argued that DWR relied exclusively on the verified
report and did not support its forfeiture claim with additional evidence. The court, however, agreed with DWR's argument that the
verified report was prima facie evidence of nonuse that, if uncontradicted, was sufficient to sustain a verdict. The court reasoned that after
DWR presents a verified report, the owner of the water right has the
burden to show either lawful and beneficial use of the water or due
and sufficient cause for its nonuse. Because Frick Farm established
neither of these elements, the court held that substantial evidence existed to support the termination of Frick Farm's water right.
The court affirmed the DWR's order terminating Frick Farm's water right because DWR followed the relevant statutory procedures, did
not violate Frick Farm's due process fights, and presented substantial
evidence of Frick Farm's forfeiture.
MichaelEden
MONTANA
Bitterroot River Protective Ass'n v. Bitterroot Conservation Dist., 2008
MT 377, 346 Mont. 507, 198 P.3d 219 (holding that the Montana Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act applies to Mitchell Slough
because it meets the definition of a "natural, perennial flowing
stream," and the Montana Stream Access Law applies to Mitchell
Slough because it meets the definition of a "natural water body").
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The Bitterroot River runs through Ravalli County in southwestern
Montana. Roughly paralleling the Bitterroot River on its eastern side is
a body of water called Mitchell Slough. Mitchell Slough splits off from
the Bitterroot River, carrying a large portion of the river's flow, which
runs down the watercourse and subsequently empties the remnant water back into the Bitterroot River ten miles downstream.
Mitchell Slough shares attributes of both a natural stream and of a
man-made diversion off the Bitterroot River. Some historic documents
refer to Mitchell Slough, or portions of the Mitchell Slough, as the
Right Fork of the St. Mary's Fork of the Bitterroot River. Mitchell
Slough flows continuously year-round, with a large portion of the flow
coming from the Bitterroot River diversion, with no documentation of
it ever running dry. Additionally, Mitchell Slough acts as a natural
channel, supporting a riparian ecosystems and a resident fishery.
However, the Mitchell Slough also has a long documentable history of
use as a canal. A headgate existed on the Bitterroot River as early as
1915 to control diversions into Mitchell Slough. Furthermore, many
secondary diversion structures re-divert Bitterroot River water out of
Mitchell Slough at various locales and irrigate around 4,300 acres.
In 1999, the Bitterroot Conservation District ("BCD") began a determination of whether Mitchell Slough was a natural, perennially flowing stream under the Natural Streambed and Land Preservation Act
("310 Law"). The 310 Law forbids any activity that alters or modifies
the bed or banks of a "natural, perennial flowing stream" without a
permit issued from a local conservation district like the BCD. The
BCD subsequently found that Mitchell Slough was not a natural water
body under the language of the 310. Law, and therefore activities on
the Slough do not require 310 Law permits.
The Bitterroot River Protective Association ("BRPA") sought judicial review of the BCD's 310 Law decision, alleging the BCD erred in its
determination of Mitchell Slough as a non-natural stream. Other parties to the BRPA suit also alleged that the public had access to the waters of the Mitchell Slough under The Montana Stream Access Law
("SAL"), which allows public access and recreation on "natural water
bodies." A group of landowners along Mitchell Slough ("Landowners"), however, intervened seeking a declaration that the slough was
not subject to SAL. BRPA in response successfully moved forjoinder
of the Montana Department of Fish Wildlife and Parks ("FWP") as an
involuntary plaintiff. Therefore, under the SAL question BRPA and
FWP argued against Landowners, seeking a determination that
Mitchell Slough exists as a natural water body within the meaning of
the SAL.
On both matters, 310 Law as well as SAL, the District Court ruled
that Mitchell Slough was not a "natural" stream. The district court
ruled that 310 Law intended a natural, perennially flowing stream to
mean one "in the absence of man-made manipulation." It similarly
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found that under SAL, a natural water body is one that is not "artificial
or manufactured." Under both definitions, the district court ruled
that, due to the headgate on the Bitterroot River and man-made channel work, Mitchell Slough existed as a man-made entity. Under the
respective decisions, 310 Law did not protect Mitchell Slough from
alteration of bed or banks without a permit, and SAL did not protect
public recreational access and enjoyment of the Mitchell Slough waters. The BCRP appealed to the Montana Supreme Court, and the
court considered issues related to both the 310 Law and the SAL.
First, the court looked to whether the district court erred in upholding that Mitchell Slough did not qualify as a natural perennial
flowing stream under 310 Law. The court noted that the 310 Law
lacked a definition of "natural, perennial-flowing stream." Therefore
the court looked to the purpose of the 310 Law. Since the title of the
law purports to "preserv[e] the natural or existing shape, form and
course of streams," the court held that it contemplated protection of
water bodies even if those waters were no longer purely "natural." In
such circumstances, the court ruled that important factors to consider
include: whether portions of flow in the water body occur naturally,
whether the banks and channel retain a natural character, and
whether the water body occurred naturally but currently exists with
extensive man-made modifications. Since Mitchell Slough contains
some naturally occurring flow, not originating from the diversion of
the Bitterroot River, and since natural channel characteristics exist, the
310 Law intended to protect the water body as it existed, even with extensive man-made modifications.
Following this line of reasoning, the court determined that the district court erred in its interpretation of "natural." The court pointed
out that if it were to adopt the district court's definition of "natural,"
the 310 Law would not even apply to the Bitterroot River because the
river does not flow in absence of man-made manipulation. The court
concluded that limiting the 310 Law's applicability to "flows which have
never been diverted, impounded, or appropriated" would be unreasonably narrow. Therefore, the district court erred in upholding the
BCD's declaratory ruling on Mitchell Slough as a matter of law. Furthermore, the purpose of the 310 Law protects Mitchell Slough as a
natural perennial flowing stream.
Next, the court looked to whether the district court erred in finding that Mitchell Slough did not qualify as a natural water body under
SAL. The court noted that analysis under SAL of a "natural water
body" was separate and distinct from the 310 Law analysis of a "natural,
perennial-flowing stream." As such, the court's findings regarding 310
Law had no bearing on Mitchell Slough's status under SAL. Under
SAL, the court identified three issues regarding Mitchell Slough's
qualifications for public recreational use: (1) whether Mitchell Slough
could capably support recreational use; (2) whether Mitchell Slough
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qualified as a "natural water body;" and (3) whether Mitchell Slough
qualified as not merely a diversion of water "away from a natural water
body - - one of the SAL's exceptions."

Under the SAL analysis, the court first addressed Mitchell Slough's
capacity for recreational use. It highlighted a history of hunting, boating, and fishing, with testimony establishing extensive fishing on
Mitchell Slough as early as 1928. It held Mitchell Slough was capable
of recreational use. Next, the court addressed whether Mitchell
Slough qualified as a natural body of water under SAL. In review of
the facts, the court highlighted evidence suggesting that Mitchell
Slough once existed as a channel of the Bitterroot River. It also highlighted that Mitchell Slough included tributary groundwater, various
surface water additions, and irrigation waste and return flows. In doing so, the court noted that although the Mitchell Slough is a diversion, the history and character of Mitchell Slough qualify it as a natural
body of water under SAL. The court then discussed the final element,
whether Mitchell Slough existed as a mere diversion from a natural
body of water, which would preclude it from public access under SAL.
Because of the same facts that indicate that Mitchell Slough qualifies as
a natural body of water, the court held that this SAL exception did not
apply to Mitchell Slough. Under the three elements of SAL, the court
found that Mitchell Slough qualified for public access.
The court stated that, although the district court defined natural as
"uninfluenced by man in any way," a more appropriate analysis would
focus "on how and to what extant man has impacted the waterway."
Under such an analysis, the Mitchell Slough existed as a natural body
of water, not merely as a diversion. As such, the court held that SAL
applied, allowing public access to Mitchell Slough. The court noted,
however, that this ruling does not allow unfettered public access across
private lands.
The court reversed and remanded for ajudgment in favor of BCRP
under 310 Law, and ajudgment in favor of BCRP and FWP under SAL.
Ryan McLane

NEBRASKA
Bihuniak v. Roberta Corrigan Farm, 757 N.W.2d 725 (Neb. Ct. App.
2008) (holding that a lower landowner was not entitled to injunctive
relief against an upper landowner, who caused increased amounts of
surface water to drain onto the lower landowner's land, because the
upper landowner behaved reasonably and without negligence).
Marilyn Bihuniak and other owners of a quarter section of farmland in Buffalo County (jointly, "Bihuniak") filed a complaint against
Roberta Corrigan Farm and other owners ("Corrigans") of land south
of Bihuniak's land. Bihuniak alleged that improvements Corrigans
made to their land to construct a hardware store caused greater
amounts of diffused surface water to drain onto Bihuniak's lower land,

